LI.FI / Jumper: cross-chain bridges rating breakdown
The most widely integrated routing layer in the industry, and genuinely convenient.
The most widely integrated routing layer in the industry, and genuinely convenient.
How the score is built
Each criterion is scored 0–10 and weighted. The median column is the middle score across every entry in this ranking, so a row reads as a position rather than a number.
| Criterion | What we measured | Weight | Score | Category median | Rank | Weighted gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trust assumption | — | 40% | 3 | 4 | 11 of 16 | -0.40 |
| The upgrade key | — | 15% | 2 | 3 | 12 of 16 | -0.15 |
| Incidents — and did users get paid | — | 25% | 3 | 9 | 15 of 16 | -1.50 |
| Audits and transparency | — | 10% | 5 | 5.5 | 9 of 16 | -0.05 |
| Cost and speed | — | 10% | 5 | 6 | 14 of 16 | -0.10 |
Measured 15 July 2026 · weights and method · decided by incidents — and did users get paid, worth -1.50 points against the median
Trust assumption: 3/10
Not a label — a number. Who, exactly, can move the money if they collude or are compromised? A canonical rollup bridge answers "nobody: Ethereum itself verifies the withdrawal, and the seven-day window is the period in which fraud can be proven". An external committee answers with a threshold, and that threshold IS the rating: Ronin was 5-of-9 and four of those keys sat on one company's servers. Harmony was 2-of-5. We publish the signer count and the threshold wherever they exist, and where a project will not state them, that silence is scored as the risk it is.
Scored 3 of 10 against a category median of 4, which places it 11th of 16 among cross-chain bridges on this criterion. At a 40% weight that is 0.40 points below the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 10, the worst 2.
The upgrade key: 2/10
The assumption that quietly overrides the whitepaper. A bridge whose contracts can be upgraded by a small multisig HAS that multisig as its real trust model, whatever the architecture diagram says — and Nomad proves it: the bug that lost $186m was introduced BY an upgrade. So we ask who holds upgrade authority, and we score the answer rather than the design.
Scored 2 of 10 against a category median of 3, which places it 12th of 16 among cross-chain bridges on this criterion. At a 15% weight that is 0.15 points below the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 7, the worst 1.
Incidents — and did users get paid: 3/10
Every exploit with its root cause, and then the column nobody else publishes: were users made whole, and is that INDEPENDENTLY confirmed or merely claimed? Read the results carefully, because they do not mean what people think. Reimbursement in this category has tracked the sponsor’s balance sheet, not the bridge’s security. That makes "they paid people back last time" close to worthless as a safety signal, and we score it accordingly.
Scored 3 of 10 against a category median of 9, which places it 15th of 16 among cross-chain bridges on this criterion. At a 25% weight that is 1.50 points below the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 10, the worst 3.
Audits and transparency: 5/10
Named firms, dated reports, published. An unnamed audit is not an audit. Undisclosed validator counts are scored as undisclosed, not assumed benign.
Scored 5 of 10 against a category median of 5.5, which places it 9th of 16 among cross-chain bridges on this criterion. At a 10% weight that is 0.05 points below the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 8, the worst 4.
Cost and speed: 5/10
Deliberately the smallest weight, and one qualification matters more than the number: we refuse to treat the canonical bridge’s seven-day withdrawal window as a defect. It is not a delay that clever engineering removed — it is the exact period during which Ethereum can be used to prove a withdrawal fraudulent. A fast bridge is fast for one reason: it substituted somebody’s signature for that proof.
Scored 5 of 10 against a category median of 6, which places it 14th of 16 among cross-chain bridges on this criterion. At a 10% weight that is 0.10 points below the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 9, the worst 5.
Other measurements
- who can add code to the router
- the LI.FI team — which is how the 2024 exploit was introduced SOURCED
Its nearest neighbours in this ranking
| # | Entry | Incidents — and did users get paid | How it differs |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 | Socket / Bungee | 4 | Ahead by 1 on incidents — and did users get paid. |
| 15 | THORChain | 3 | Level on incidents — and did users get paid; the gap is elsewhere. |
Incidents priced into this score
- 2024-07-16 — A newly added contract facet allowed draining of wallets with infinite approvals to the router. Not a failure of any underlying bridge — the aggregator was the vulnerability. [users made whole: unknown] [source]
Questions about this score
What happened in the LI.FI exploit?
+
In July 2024 a newly added route in LI.FI's router contract was exploited to drain roughly $11.6m from wallets that had granted the router infinite token approvals. No underlying bridge failed. It was the second such incident in the category in six months, after Socket's $3.3m loss in January 2024.
Should I stop using aggregators?
+
They are useful and they are an extra layer of risk, which is a manageable combination if you handle approvals properly: never grant unlimited spending to a router, approve only the amount you are moving, and revoke afterwards. Both major aggregator losses turned on infinite approvals that users had granted and forgotten.