Compound: lending platforms rating breakdown
V3, 10 chains
The protocol that defined the category, and still one of the most conservative designs in it: V3 markets have a single borrowable asset per market, which is a blunt but genuinely effective containment strategy. $1.55bn deposited across 10 chains, with no depositor-loss event.
The protocol that defined the category, and still one of the most conservative designs in it: V3 markets have a single borrowable asset per market, which is a blunt but genuinely effective containment strategy. $1.55bn deposited across 10 chains, with no depositor-loss event.
How the score is built
Each criterion is scored 0–10 and weighted. The median column is the middle score across every entry in this ranking, so a row reads as a position rather than a number.
| Criterion | What we measured | Weight | Score | Category median | Rank | Weighted gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incidents, bad debt, and who ate it | — | 32% | 6 | 6.5 | 6 of 10 | -0.16 |
| What the market actually earns | 1.53 gross yield per dollar deposited · computed · 2026-08-27 · source | 22% | 5 | 7.5 | 8 of 10 | -0.55 |
| Scale and the ability to exit | $1.55bn total value locked · sourced · 2026-08-27 · source | 22% | 7 | 7 | 5 of 10 | 0.00 |
| Risk architecture | — | 14% | 8 | 7 | 1 of 10 | +0.14 |
| Chains and assets | 10 chains with deposits · sourced · 2026-08-27 · source | 10% | 7 | 6 | 4 of 10 | +0.10 |
Measured 27 August 2026 · weights and method · decided by what the market actually earns, worth -0.55 points against the median
Incidents, bad debt, and who ate it: 6/10
Every exploit and every bad-debt event with dates and amounts, and then the question that decides whether it matters: were depositors made whole, and by whom. Euler lost $197m in March 2023 and returned 100% of it after negotiating with the attacker. Venus carried nine figures of bad debt from a single oracle manipulation in 2021. Those are opposite outcomes from superficially similar headlines, and a rating that treats "has been hacked" as one fact is useless.
Scored 6 of 10 against a category median of 6.5, which places it 6th of 10 among lending platforms on this criterion. At a 32% weight that is 0.16 points below the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 9, the worst 3.
What the market actually earns: 5/10
Computed by us: thirty days of protocol fees, annualised, divided by total value locked. That is the gross interest the market genuinely generated per dollar deposited — before the protocol’s cut and before incentives. It is the honest version of the APY a front end shows you, and it separates a market where borrowers are really paying from one where the TVL headline is parked capital earning close to nothing.
Scored 5 of 10 against a category median of 7.5, which places it 8th of 10 among lending platforms on this criterion. At a 22% weight that is 0.55 points below the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 10, the worst 1.
Scale and the ability to exit: 7/10
Total value locked at a stated timestamp, and whether the market is deep enough that a withdrawal at size does not itself move the utilisation rate. In lending, depth is not a convenience — a market that is 99% utilised cannot pay you out until somebody repays.
Scored 7 of 10 against a category median of 7, which places it 5th of 10 among lending platforms on this criterion. At a 22% weight that is exactly level with the median of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 10, the worst 4.
Risk architecture: 8/10
Sourced to documentation: are markets isolated or pooled, what oracle secures each collateral, who can change a listing or a loan-to-value ratio and how fast, and — for the newer curated-vault designs — who exactly is picking your risk and whether they carry any of it. A single shared pool means one bad listing can impair everyone.
Scored 8 of 10 against a category median of 7, which places it 1st of 10 among lending platforms on this criterion. At a 14% weight that is 0.14 points above the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 8, the worst 3.
Chains and assets: 7/10
Deployments with real deposits, not deployment count. A protocol on forty chains with liquidity on three is scored on the three.
Scored 7 of 10 against a category median of 6, which places it 4th of 10 among lending platforms on this criterion. At a 10% weight that is 0.10 points above the median contribution of the weighted total. The best score in the category is 10, the worst 1.
Its nearest neighbours in this ranking
Incidents priced into this score
- 2021-09-30 — A governance upgrade to the Comptroller misdistributed roughly $80m of COMP tokens to users. Depositor funds were never at risk; the loss fell on the protocol’s own treasury and was partly recovered through voluntary returns. [users made whole: n/a] [source]
Questions about this score
What happened in the Compound COMP distribution bug?
+
In September 2021 a governance upgrade to the Comptroller contract misdistributed roughly $80m of COMP tokens to users. Depositor funds were never at risk — the loss fell on the protocol's own treasury, and some tokens were voluntarily returned. It remains the clearest example in DeFi of a correctly executed governance process producing a catastrophic outcome, which is a different failure mode from an exploit and one that timelocks do not fully solve.
Why does Compound have one borrowable asset per market?
+
Containment. In a shared pool, a collateral that turns out to be worthless can leave bad debt that every depositor shares — the failure that cost Venus nine figures. Compound V3 confines each market to a single borrowable asset, so the damage from a mispriced collateral cannot spread beyond that market. It costs capital efficiency and, on the evidence of its 1.53% gross yield, it has cost borrower demand.