Ratings · Graded on the public record
Who manages DAO treasuries and token liquidity — and how openly
A DAO treasury or liquidity manager runs assets it does not own, under a mandate from a DAO or a token issuer: diversifying a treasury, deploying protocol-owned liquidity, making markets or managing AMM positions. We grade each firm A to F on whether the mandate is public, the money disclosed, and the work reported.
The short answer
A crypto market maker quotes buy and sell prices for a token so it can be traded. A DAO treasury manager runs a DAO's own assets under a mandate. In our grades, the firms that leave assets in the client's Safe or vault and report in public come out on top: Aera and kpk grade A on all three blocks, and TokenLogic and Steakhouse Financial are also A overall. The market makers grade C or D, because none of the five discloses an amount under management or publishes reporting on client tokens. Grades reflect the public record as of September 21, 2026, not investment returns.
The verdict
checked September 21, 2026ENS sets its permissions by on-chain vote, it never takes custody, and its Endowment reports have been public every month since 2023.
Gauntlet runs the strategies as guardian, but the vault owner sets what it may do, and it cannot move funds out.
None of the five publishes an amount under management or any public reporting on what it does with a client’s tokens.
What we did
We looked for each firm’s mandates in DAO governance records and in announcements from both sides, read what each discloses about the money it manages and who can move it, and checked what anyone outside the client can see — then graded three blocks from A to F, with every fact sourced and dated.
Custody is the dividing line
The six firms graded highest never take custody of what they manage: they act through Safes and vaults whose permissions are limited and visible on-chain.
The market makers work the other way round. Wintermute, GSR and Kairon Labs describe deals in which the client lends them its tokens; Flowdesk keeps client assets in its own Fireblocks workspace, and in 2025 a TreasureDAO contributor proposed withdrawing an idle $785,000 held there. That is how market making usually works, and it is legitimate. It also means the client is trusting a company, and none of the five publishes what it does with the tokens.
The ranking
15 graded1
AeraVault protocol · run by GauntletAAAA
Xai announced the mandate itself, the manager cannot withdraw funds, and vault documentation and dashboards are public.
Strengths
- ✓A client announced the mandate itself
- ✓The manager cannot withdraw funds; its allowed actions are set by the vault owner
- ✓Vault documentation and dashboards are public
Weaknesses
- ✕Aera is the vault; the manager is Gauntlet, so the two are graded together
- ✕Its focus has moved towards earn vaults for fintechs and institutions
- ✕No result found for the Arbitrum treasury proposal
2
kpkTreasury manager · formerly karpatkeyAAAA
ENS sets its permissions by on-chain vote, it never takes custody, and anyone can read its monthly Endowment reports.
Strengths
- ✓Its permissions over the ENS Endowment are set by on-chain DAO votes
- ✓Non-custodial: it acts inside the client’s own Safe, with restricted roles
- ✓Monthly public reports for the ENS Endowment since 2023
Weaknesses
- ✕Two firm-wide size figures on its own site, $8bn+ and $300m+, measure different things and are not labelled clearly
- ✕Public reporting found for ENS only; most listed clients are named by kpk alone
- ✕Its Aave treasury role appears to have ended in December 2024, while Aave stays on its client list
3
TokenLogicTreasury managerAABA
Aave DAO has renewed its mandate by vote, and it moves treasury funds through contracts that deny it custody; Aave is its only documented client.
Strengths
- ✓Mandate renewed by Aave DAO vote, with terms and payment published
- ✓Moves treasury funds through Steward contracts, without taking custody
- ✓Maintains a public dashboard of Aave’s finances
Weaknesses
- ✕One documented client: Aave
- ✕No current figure for the treasury it works on; the last one we found is from November 2023
- ✕A delegate objected in 2026 that the team preparing financial proposals would also maintain the tool that validates governance proposals
4
Steakhouse FinancialTreasury manager & vault curatorABAA
Compound’s treasury committee chose it to curate up to about $12M, its vaults leave the DAO holding the shares, and it publishes monthly Arbitrum reports.
Strengths
- ✓Non-custodial vaults with separated curator, sentinel and guardian roles
- ✓Monthly public reports for programmes it runs for DAOs
- ✓Discloses total assets supplied to its vaults
Weaknesses
- ✕DAO treasury work is now a side line next to vault curation for fintechs and exchanges
- ✕No completed vote found for the Compound appointment
- ✕The $4.34B figure is undated
5AAvantgarde FinanceTreasury managerBABB
Nexus Mutual documents Avantgarde executing its vault allocations; the firm’s homepage gives two different treasury totals and links to no public reports.
Strengths
- ✓The client keeps custody; Avantgarde manages as a delegate on the client’s Enzyme vault
- ✓A client, Nexus Mutual, voted on its proposal and documents the relationship itself
Weaknesses
- ✕Two different treasury totals on the same homepage, both undated
- ✕No regular public reports found
- ✕Homepage logos do not distinguish treasury clients from other relationships
6
Re7 CapitalVault curator · Re7 LabsBCAA
Its vaults are public and non-custodial, but no DAO has voted it a treasury, and it absorbed Stream Finance bad debt in 2025.
Strengths
- ✓Curates without holding deposits; a guardian can veto changes
- ✓Every vault is public on-chain
- ✓Value managed is tracked independently
Weaknesses
- ✕No DAO treasury mandate on the record; issuer roles are curation of public vaults
- ✕Took about $27.4M of bad debt in the November 2025 Stream Finance collapse
- ✕The firm-wide “$1B+ Deployed” is undated
7
Arrakis FinanceOn-chain market maker for token issuersBBAD
The issuer owns each vault and can withdraw at any time, but Arrakis publishes no reports on what it does inside them.
Strengths
- ✓The issuer owns the vault and can withdraw at any time
- ✓A DAO treasury holds Arrakis-managed vaults
- ✓Value managed is tracked independently
Weaknesses
- ✕No public dashboard or reports on what it does in a client’s vault
- ✕Two DAO proposals naming it were not enacted
- ✕An Arrakis vault lost 2.94 WETH to an exploit in August 2026; whether users were made whole is not reported
8
Steer ProtocolAutomated liquidity managerBCBB
Its clients appear only as testimonials on its own site, and it does not document what its strategists can do with vault funds.
Strengths
- ✓Non-custodial vaults
- ✓Public vault listing
- ✓Value managed is tracked independently
Weaknesses
- ✕Clients named only in testimonials on its own site
- ✕Strategist and keeper permissions are not documented
- ✕Vault value has roughly halved since September 2025
9
ICHIAutomated liquidity managerBDAB
Its vaults are non-custodial with no privileged rebalance function, but its only DAO case study does not name the DAO.
Strengths
- ✓Non-custodial vaults with no privileged rebalance function
- ✓Value managed is tracked independently
Weaknesses
- ✕Its DAO case study does not name the DAO
- ✕Vault value has fallen from $35.4M to $8.1M in a year
- ✕A 2022 bad-debt episode in an ICHI-run lending pool sent its token down about 90%
10
Kairon LabsMarket makerCADC
Elastos’s council voted to appoint it in 2022, but where borrowed client tokens are held is not public, and reports go to clients only.
Strengths
- ✓A DAO council voted to appoint it
- ✓Weekly liquidity dashboards for clients
Weaknesses
- ✕No amount under management, and custody of borrowed tokens not described
- ✕Its own figures vary: founding year 2017 or 2018, 300 or 500+ clients
- ✕Reports go to clients only
11
Gamma StrategiesAutomated liquidity managerCDBB
No DAO mandate is on the record, its vault value has fallen 94% since January 2025, and Gamma estimated 25–40% recoveries after its 2024 exploit.
Strengths
- ✓Non-custodial vaults with open withdrawals
- ✓Public vault listing, with rebalances visible on-chain
Weaknesses
- ✕No DAO mandate over treasury assets on the record
- ✕An exploit in January 2024 took an estimated $3.4M–$6.2M; Gamma estimated 25–40% recoveries
- ✕Vault value has fallen about 94% since January 2025
12
KeyrockMarket makerCBDC
Radix confirms the engagement, while loan terms are private and reports go only to the client, so the public record ends at the announcement.
Strengths
- ✓A client-side announcement confirms the Radix engagement
- ✓Trading statistics for clients on demand
Weaknesses
- ✕No amount managed or volume disclosed
- ✕Loan terms for client tokens are not public
- ✕Its Morpho vaults hold its own idle USDC, so they say nothing about client mandates
13
FlowdeskMarket makerCADF
SG-FORGE names it as market maker on its own site; Flowdesk holds client assets itself, segregated, and publishes nothing about client reporting.
Strengths
- ✓A regulated client names it on the client’s own website
- ✓Authorised under MiCA and licensed by VARA in Dubai
- ✓Client assets are segregated from the firm’s own
Weaknesses
- ✕Client assets are in Flowdesk’s custody, not the client’s
- ✕No amount under management disclosed
- ✕Nothing published on how, or whether, it reports to clients
14
GSRMarket makerDBDF
It proposed its token-loan terms to Stake DAO in public in 2022, with no vote recorded, and publishes no reporting on client tokens.
Strengths
- ✓Its deal terms were proposed in public, on the DAO’s own forum
- ✓Operating since 2013
Weaknesses
- ✕Client tokens are lent to GSR outright
- ✕No confirmed vote on its Stake DAO proposal
- ✕No public reporting on client mandates
15
WintermuteMarket makerDBDF
Its DAO market-making proposals are public, the tokens are lent to it outright, and we found no public reporting on what it does with them.
Strengths
- ✓Deal terms with DAOs have been proposed in public, on governance forums
- ✓Liquidity across more than 60 venues
Weaknesses
- ✕Client tokens are lent to Wintermute outright, with an option to pay cash instead of returning them
- ✕No public reporting on what it does with a client’s tokens
- ✕Lost about $160M from its DeFi operations in a September 2022 hack; it said it stayed solvent and OTC was unaffected
Open a row for the verdict and the quick read, or a firm’s name for every fact behind its grades, with sources.
Guide
Understanding dao treasury & liquidity managers
What a crypto market maker does for a token
A crypto market maker keeps a token tradable by posting buy and sell orders on exchanges, earning the spread between them. For a token issuer or DAO, hiring one means its token has steady quotes and depth on the venues where people trade it.
The firms in this rating describe two ways of being paid. Under a retainer, the client pays a fee for the service. Under a loan-and-call deal, the client lends the market maker its tokens to quote with, and at the end of the term the market maker either returns them or pays a cash amount fixed in advance. Flowdesk and Kairon Labs offer both, and Keyrock runs its work under a Master Services Agreement and a Master Loan Agreement whose terms are not public.
The loan-and-call structure works like an option held by the market maker. If the token ends the term above the price implied by the cash amount, paying cash and keeping the tokens is the cheaper choice for the firm. If it ends below, returning the tokens is. The DAO keeps the downside either way, and gives up gains above the agreed price.
Automated market makers and liquidity vaults
An automated market maker (AMM) is a different thing with a similar name: a DEX pool that prices trades from its balances, with no firm quoting at all. On concentrated-liquidity AMMs such as Uniswap v3, liquidity sits in a chosen price range and stops earning fees when the price leaves it. Someone has to move it back, and that is the job the liquidity vaults in this rating sell.
Arrakis Finance shows the custody model at its clearest. Its docs, as of October 2026, say the issuer holds an NFT that represents the vault, and whoever holds it can pause, reconfigure or withdraw at any time. Arrakis rebalances within limits, and changes to core vault parameters wait two days. Steer Protocol, Gamma and ICHI run similar automated vaults, mostly for on-chain liquidity.
A vault manages DEX pools. It does not quote on centralized exchanges, which is where most market makers spend their effort. Many token projects use both.
How a DAO keeps custody while hiring a manager
The DAO keeps custody by granting narrow, revocable permissions instead of handing over the assets. Three mechanisms in this rating do that.
- Safe plus a roles module. The DAO's assets stay in its own Safe, and the Zodiac Roles Modifier grants the manager the right to call specific functions on specific contracts with allowed parameter values, without the Safe's signers approving each transaction. kpk works for the ENS Endowment this way.
- Vaults with separated roles. On Morpho, a curator sets caps, an allocator moves funds between approved markets, and a sentinel can cut risk or cancel pending changes. Harmful curator actions wait behind a timelock of zero to three weeks.
- Guardian vaults. On Aera, the vault owner sets what the guardian may do, and the guardian cannot withdraw funds or widen its own permissions.
Each of these leaves a trail on-chain that the DAO's members can read. A multisig is the base layer for all three, and our guide on multisig wallets explains how one works.
What treasury and liquidity managers charge
Where fees are public, they are usually a share of what the strategy earns or a small annual percentage of assets. As of our September 2026 review:
- Steakhouse Financial: 0.5% a year for curating up to about $12M of Compound's USDC, with 30 days' notice to end it.
- Steer Protocol: a 15% performance fee on its Smart Pools.
- Gamma: 14% to 20% of earned fees on its vaults.
- ICHI: a 10% performance fee taken from swap fees by default, with custom terms for larger deployments.
Market makers' fees are rarely public. Under a loan-and-call deal, the main cost is economic rather than a line item: the option the DAO grants on its own tokens.
How to read the letter grades
Each firm is graded A to F on three blocks, mandate, money and transparency, and the overall grade is their average. A, C and F have written conditions, shown in the rubric. B and D are given when the condition for the grade above is partly met.
Of the 15 firms graded, four are A overall, five B, four C and two D. One more, a former Aave service provider, is held back because it no longer offers the service. Losses appear on each firm's page rather than in the grade. For example, an ICHI-run lending pool took on bad debt in 2022, and an Arrakis vault lost 2.94 WETH to an exploit in August 2026. Shrinking vaults are recorded too: ICHI's fell from $35.4M to $8.1M in a year, and Gamma's by about 94% since January 2025.
How we grade evidence across all categories is set out on our methodology page.
Before you choose
7 checks- Search the DAO's own forum and Snapshot or Tally for a vote naming the manager, the amount and the fee before relying on a client logo.
- Get the exact permissions the manager will hold, as a Roles Modifier configuration or vault role list, and check them against the deployed contract.
- For a market maker on a loan-and-call deal, write down the cash amount per token and compare it with today's price.
- Read the vault's timelock length and who can cancel a pending change.
- Check the manager's vault value on-chain over the past year, not just its stated assets under management.
- Confirm where performance and management fees are taken from, and on what base.
- Read the firm's loss record on its page here and check whether affected users were made whole.
Terms on this page
9 terms- Mandate
- The authority a DAO or issuer gives a firm over its assets, ideally granted by a public vote or an agreement both sides name.
- Market maker
- A firm that posts buy and sell quotes for a token across exchanges and earns the spread between them.
- Loan-and-call deal
- An arrangement in which the client lends tokens to a market maker, who later returns them or pays a cash amount fixed in advance.
- Retainer model
- A market-making arrangement in which the client pays a fee for the service instead of lending tokens on option terms.
- Automated market maker (AMM)
- A DEX pool that prices trades from its token balances, with no firm quoting.
- Liquidity vault
- A contract that holds a concentrated-liquidity position and rebalances it as the price moves, for a share of fees.
- Protocol-owned liquidity
- DEX liquidity that a DAO supplies from its own treasury instead of renting it from outside providers with incentives.
- Zodiac Roles Modifier
- A module for a Safe that lets other addresses call only specified functions with allowed parameters.
- Performance fee
- A share of the returns or trading fees a strategy earns, taken by the manager.
How we grade this
three blocks, A to FThree blocks, each graded A to F from facts we could source. A fact we could not source is recorded as not published and graded as missing, never assumed.
| Block | What we check | A | C | F |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mandatemandate | Is there public confirmation of the firm’s authority over the client’s assets? | A DAO vote, or an agreement named by both sides | The client is named only by the manager | No clients are named |
| Moneymoney | Is the amount under management disclosed, and is it described how the firm reaches the assets? | Amount disclosed; management is non-custodial with restricted permissions | Amount disclosed; access is not described | Nothing is disclosed |
| Transparencytransparency | Can the client and the public see what is done with the assets? | Regular public reports, or an on-chain dashboard | Reports go to the client only | No reporting |
- B and D are given when the condition for the grade above is partly met.
- For sorting, A = 4, B = 3, C = 2, D = 1, F = 0. The overall grade is the average of the three blocks, rounded to the nearest letter, halves up. Only the letter is shown.
- Two firms with the same average are ordered by their mandate grade, then alphabetically.
- Under every firm is a one-sentence verdict, written from the facts on its card and signed by a member of the desk.
How to choose a DAO treasury or liquidity manager
Start with custody, then check the public record. A good DAO treasury manager works inside a Safe or vault the DAO owns, under permissions the DAO has voted on, and reports in public on what it did with the money. Of the 15 firms in this rating, four meet that closely enough to grade A overall: Aera, kpk, TokenLogic and Steakhouse Financial. At the other end, none of the five market makers publishes an amount under management or any public reporting on what it does with a client’s tokens.
Treasury managers, vault protocols and market makers are different products
Treasury managers act on assets that never leave the client. kpk holds “strictly limited permissions within client-owned Safes”; TokenLogic moves Aave’s funds through Finance Steward contracts that stop it taking custody; Avantgarde Finance is a delegated manager on an Enzyme vault the client owns.
Vault protocols and curators keep capital in contracts and let the manager rebalance within limits. Aera’s guardians cannot withdraw funds; an Arrakis vault belongs to the token issuer, who can withdraw at any time; ICHI vaults have no privileged rebalance function.
Market makers usually take the tokens. Wintermute, GSR and Kairon Labs describe deals in which the client lends them its tokens, and Flowdesk keeps client assets in its own Fireblocks workspace. That is the right tool for exchange liquidity, but it is a different relationship: the DAO is trusting a company rather than granting a permission.
What counts as a real mandate
The strongest evidence is the client’s own governance. ENS DAO puts kpk’s permissions over its Endowment to on-chain votes; Aave governance has renewed TokenLogic by name; Nexus Mutual members voted for NMPIP 196, staking 6,624 WETH through Kiln on Avantgarde’s proposal; and Elastos’s Cyber Republic council approved Kairon Labs as market maker, 11 of its 12 members in favour.
A proposal with no recorded result is weaker. Wintermute’s 2021 offer to Index Coop and GSR’s 2022 offer to Stake DAO are both public, and neither page records a vote. Weakest of all is a client named only by the firm: Steer Protocol’s clients appear as testimonials on its own site, and ICHI’s DAO case study does not name the DAO.
Why market makers grade lowest
Because the standard deal is a token loan with an option attached. Under Index Coop’s IIP-83, Wintermute would borrow 100,000 INDEX for a year and then either return it or pay a fixed $5M or $7.5M; GSR proposed borrowing 1,250,000 SDT, about 3% of Stake DAO’s supply, on similar terms. The tokens sit with the market maker for the length of the deal, none of the five discloses how much it manages, and none publishes what it does with a client’s tokens. A DAO hiring one should write the reporting into the contract, because it will not appear otherwise.
How much money these firms manage
Where the assets sit in public contracts, the size can be checked. Value in each firm’s vaults on 21 September 2026:
- Aera: $249.1M
- Re7 Labs: $90.5M
- Arrakis: $60.1M
- Steer: $21.9M
- ICHI: $8.1M
- Gamma: $3.3M, down from $58.8M at the start of 2025
The ENS Endowment that kpk manages stood at $67.7M on 30 June 2026. Totals the firms publish themselves are harder to use: kpk’s site shows “$8,000,000,000+” deployed on one page and “$300m+” on another, Avantgarde’s homepage gives both “more than $60M” and “more than $90M”, and Re7 Capital’s “$1B+ Deployed” carries no date.
What the grades do not tell you
They grade what is on the record, not how well the money was run. Returns, fees against results and execution quality are not graded, because almost none of it is published. Losses are recorded on each firm’s page with their sources instead: an exploit at Gamma Strategies in January 2024, after which Gamma estimated 25–40% recoveries; about $27.4M of bad debt in Re7 Labs vaults after the Stream Finance collapse in November 2025; and about $160M taken from Wintermute’s DeFi operations in 2022.
Questions to ask before you hire one
- Will the assets stay in a Safe or vault the DAO owns — and if not, who holds the keys?
- Which permissions does the manager get, and can the DAO revoke them without the manager’s help?
- Will the appointment go to a DAO vote, with the fee, term and termination notice in the proposal?
- Will reports be public, how often, and where will they be posted?
- For a market maker: are the tokens lent, at what repayment terms, and what reporting is in the contract?
What changed since last time
1 entry- 2026-09-21Category published: fifteen firms graded, one held back.Treasury and liquidity managers publish almost nothing to measure, so this rating grades the public record instead — the mandate, the money and the reporting — rather than inventing a 0–10 score.
Questions
9 questionsWhat does a DAO treasury manager do?
It runs assets it does not own, under a mandate from a DAO or a token issuer: diversifying a treasury out of the project’s own token, placing stablecoins in lending or staking, deploying protocol-owned liquidity, or managing liquidity positions on exchanges. The better arrangements leave the assets in the DAO’s own Safe or vault and give the manager only the permissions the DAO voted for — kpk operates that way for the ENS Endowment, and Aera’s vaults stop the manager withdrawing funds at all.
What is the difference between a treasury manager and a market maker?
Custody, mostly. The treasury managers and vault protocols at the top of this ranking work inside wallets or vaults the client owns. The market makers work differently: Wintermute, GSR and Kairon Labs describe deals in which the client lends them its tokens, often with the option to pay cash instead of returning them, and Flowdesk holds client assets in its own Fireblocks workspace. None of the five market makers here publishes an amount under management or any public reporting on client tokens.
Why letter grades instead of a score out of ten?
Because these firms publish almost nothing we can measure. Our other ratings score measurable things — a fee, a spread, a reserve ratio — on 0 to 10. Here the evidence is a public record: a vote, an amount, a report. Grading that as “7.4/10” would invent a precision the evidence does not have, so each firm gets A to F on three blocks, and the overall grade is their average, computed rather than chosen.
How can I check a manager’s mandate myself?
Look for the client’s side of the record. A real mandate usually leaves a trail in the DAO’s own governance — a Snapshot or Tally vote, or a forum proposal naming the firm, the amount and the fee — or in an announcement the client itself publishes. A client named only on the manager’s own website, or a case study that does not name the client at all, tells you much less. Every mandate we cite links to the page we read and the date we read it.
Can a firm pay to be included or to improve its grade?
No firm on this page paid anything. The site can mark an entry as a sponsored inclusion, and if it ever does, the label appears in the table and on the firm’s page and its website link is marked as sponsored — but the grade and the position come from the same rubric and the same arithmetic as every other firm. Payment can change a label; it cannot change a grade.
What is a market maker in crypto?
A market maker is a firm that keeps buy and sell orders for a token on exchanges at all times, so that anyone who wants to trade finds a price and some depth. It earns the gap between its buy and sell quotes. Token issuers hire market makers so their token trades steadily after launch, usually on a retainer or by lending the firm tokens to quote with.
Who are the biggest crypto market makers?
Nobody can rank them by size from public data, because none of the five in this rating discloses assets under management. What they do publish is reach: Flowdesk says it covers more than 150 venues, Keyrock more than 85 and Wintermute more than 60. GSR, founded in 2013, is the oldest. Trading-volume claims such as $136 billion or $200 billion come without a scope or date.
Can a liquidity vault replace a market maker?
For on-chain liquidity, often yes. A vault such as Arrakis or ICHI manages the DAO's own position in a DEX pool, and the DAO can withdraw at any time. It does nothing for order books on centralized exchanges, where a market-making firm quotes with its own systems. Projects listed on both kinds of venue tend to need both.
How should a DAO check a market maker's loan terms?
Find the cash amount per token at the end of the term and compare it with today's price and supply. In Index Coop's 2021 proposal, Wintermute would borrow 100,000 INDEX for a year and then return it or pay $5M or $7.5M. Then check the term, the reporting duties, and what happens if the firm fails, since the tokens sit with it for the length of the deal.
Sources for the guide
7 sourcesHow this is funded
It is not. There are no affiliate links on this page or anywhere on this site, no paid placements and no sponsored positions. Nobody in this table can buy a place in it or influence a grade. The full policy →